Lessons to Be Learned: The Victim Compensation Fund by Morrison, Alan B.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 53 
Issue 2 Winter 2003: Symposium - After 
Disaster: The September 11th Compensation 
Fund and the Future of Civil Justice 
Article 19 
Lessons to Be Learned: The Victim Compensation Fund 
Alan B. Morrison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Alan B. Morrison, Lessons to Be Learned: The Victim Compensation Fund , 53 DePaul L. Rev. 821 (2013) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol53/iss2/19 
This Commentaries is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
LESSONS TO BE LEARNED:
THE VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
Alan B. Morrison*
INTRODUCTION
Having read the articles for this panel, and having had the benefit of
discussions during the Clifford Symposium, I want to offer some
thoughts that use the articles as a jumping off point for trying to assess
what lessons we can learn for our civil justice system from the Septem-
ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. As you will see, I draw
different lessons for mass disasters and for ordinary tort law. Before
getting to those matters, I want to spend a few minutes discussing the
Fund and what others have tried to describe as its model, and then
make a few observations about why this situation differs radically
from almost all other mass accidents, and especially mass torts, that
have been studied. At the end I have added some thoughts about
"accountability" in the context of possible September 11th litigation,
and some suggestions about what the Special Master could do to help
assure that relevant information is available for those who wish to
learn more about the Fund's operations.
II. THE SEPTEMBER 11TH FUND
Many of the articles and many of the discussants in this symposium
have attempted to describe the kind of model the Fund is, and I want
to begin by agreeing with everyone, and no one. The Fund is what
everyone says it is because almost every observation about it is accu-
rate, but limited. It is surely a direct product of the perceived need for
an airline bailout (the fact that most of the money set aside for that
purpose was neither given nor loaned to the airlines is of interest, but
not relevant to the Fund); indeed, it seems quite likely that, but for
the fact that the airlines persuaded Congress that they needed imme-
diate assistance, the Fund would not have been created eleven days
after September l1th, and perhaps not at all. It is also true that if the
Democrats in Congress had not insisted on a fund of some kind in
* Director, Public Citizen Litigation Group, Washington D.C. A more informal version of
these remarks was given after the papers at Panel V were presented on the morning of April 25,
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exchange for the bailout, there might never have been one. Moreo-
ver, the decision to ask the American Bar Association for assistance,
coupled with its wise use of Robert Peck to do much of the drafting,
contributed heavily to what many see as the "tort" model of this
program.
On the other side, the provision for offsetting "all" collateral
sources is surely attributable to "tort reformers" in Congress, for
whom the collateral source rule that denies such offsets has been a
long-term target, as well as to those of both parties who were at least
somewhat concerned with the impact of the program on the Treasury
(and, for example, saw no reason why a family that received $2 million
in life insurance should not have that taken into account in deciding
how much other taxpayers should pay for that loss). And, as Kenneth
Abraham and Kyle Logue point out, the unusual addition of life insur-
ance to the collateral source mix at least makes fiscal sense in this
context, even if not in other, more typical cases.'
Other elements, such as the no-fault liability rule, can be attributed
to the desire to obtain quick and certain compensation, although the
hoped-for speed has not materialized, not due to any fault of the Spe-
cial Master, but because the program turned out to be far more com-
plicated than its sponsors had realized. And surely the fears of airline
insolvency, not to mention the inability of many claimants to make a
case of liability against both solvent and potentially insolvent defend-
ants, led Congress to have the United States Treasury pick up the bill,
even though no one did the kind of analysis that Robert Rabin did
that would have at least raised questions about whether the defend-
ants had any realistic fear of having judgments entered against them.2
Other factors were at work also. It is impossible to overlook the
massive impact of television on the public's attitude toward the vic-
tims; and the commanding presence of New York's Republican Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani and a Republican President and House of Repre-
sentatives also made it easier to accept the concept of a no-fault Fund,
even though there was no public estimate at the time of passage of
what it might cost. And, once the idea surfaced, can you imagine any
politician saying, "Sorry, it costs too much, and we should just let the
families fight it out in the tort system, along with the property owners
and everyone else?"
1. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Kyle D. Logue, The Genie and the Bottle: Collateral Sources
Under the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L.REv. 591 (2003).
2. See Robert L. Rabin, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: A Circumscribed
Response or an Auspicious Model?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 769 (2003).
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The result of these and other pressures produced what I will call the
"political" model-a little of this and a little of that, with no unifying
theory that can explain why it was done this way in this situation and
not done, or done differently, elsewhere, in the past or in the future.
Indeed, the political model also explains some of what Special Master
Kenneth Feinberg did in the collateral source offset situation-ex-
cluding charity and the portions of pension and life insurance that the
decedents paid for themselves, despite the statutory "all." Similarly,
his informal, or perhaps formal, cap on what he will direct the Fund to
pay victims is also based on the political reality of what Congress (and
other victims, especially rescuers) will say to payouts of more than $5-
6 million. But, unlike courts and law professors, Congress does not
have to explain what it did, or why it did this or that, nor must it
create a nicely-confined model that explains it all. It just votes for
provisions in a law and leaves it to others to explain what it did and
why. In the end, even if Congress had all of the articles from this
symposium, and all the rules of the Special Master, and the comments
submitted to him sixty days after September 11th, my own view is that
there would have been a program, and it would have looked quite
similar to the one that was enacted, with the Special Master's glosses,
because, on balance, this program seems to arrive at about the right
set of compromises.
III. DEATH Is DIFFERENT
The second preliminary point I want to make is that this is not an
ordinary mass tort case, not just because there are no solvent defend-
ants that can be successfully sued, but because the vast majority of the
victims here died. In that sense it is like an airline crash case-except
the numbers in an airline crash are at worst ten percent of the deaths
on September 11th-and there is enough insurance and other money
to pay those claims. Just consider what the Fund would have looked
like if most people had lived and not died. Even if the highest earners
from Cantor Fitzgerald had been out of work for a year, given the
nature of their work, they would still have been able to resume their
work and not been permanently deprived of their earning capacity.
The firefighters and police have excellent health and disability bene-
fits, and the airline passengers would probably have been able to pro-
ceed only against the carriers, but would surely have had the best case
on liability, and might well have prevailed. In short, there might well




But, as the United States Supreme Court has said in another con-
text, "death is different,"'3 and so this Fund is different from those for
most mass torts because all of its attention is focused on what to pay
for a lost human life. This focus has another important effect: It has
caused more people to think about the law of wrongful death and to
see its problems in a way that no event has ever done before. There
are two reasons for this focus: First, death here was on a mass basis,
whereas in most large-scale cases there are many fewer deaths. Sec-
ond, this is a public program, with public regulations, assumptions,
numbers, and grids, unlike even the ordinary airplane crash where
cases are almost always settled, and all of the numbers are secret, ex-
cept to those involved.
Take the starkest example of fairness issues raised by the Fund.
Congress has told the Special Master to use tort principles of eco-
nomic loss, with the result that there are enormous disparities in what
different people, of the same age and with the same number of family
members, will receive, by a factor of up to ten (without counting col-
lateral offsets). That disparity has proven to be very hard to justify to
many people, both victims and the general public, but it reflects an
abiding principle of tort law that perhaps needs reexamination.
Another side effect of the public scrutiny of the Fund is that many
more people are now aware of the disparities in the damages that dif-
ferent states allow in wrongful death cases. The Special Master has
been generous in applying tort principles, allowing damages to the vic-
tim for pre-death pain and suffering, in the substantial and fixed
amount of $250,000, and also for loss of companionship for a surviving
spouse and each child, again in fixed amounts. 4 Some states allow one
and not the other, although it is doubtful that any state has seriously
considered what others are doing and whether its own system contin-
ues to make sense. Some allow neither, but no state has fixed
amounts for either category, even for near-instantaneous deaths like
these. Yet imagine what would have happened if the Special Master
had decided to "evaluate" the pain and suffering of each person who
died and to assess the emotional loss, on an individual basis, of each
surviving family member who is eligible for compensation.
The open process that the Fund used may cause others who lose
family members to ask: "Why should I be treated differently from
those who died on September 11th?" And they will have the data to
back up those differences in individual treatment because the Fund is
3. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2003).
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a public entity and its rules spell out who will get what under what
circumstances. Similarly, there may be questions raised about why
one state disallows certain damages that the Fund allows, and it may
cause an increased focus on how human life should be valued in the
tort context. It is also possible that these values will be exported to
the regulatory area, where the Bush Administration and its supporters
regularly tout cost-benefit analysis, and now will have to try to fit in
the wide range of values under the Fund, with the values that agencies
are now ascribing to human life for regulatory purposes.
For these reasons, if the Fund is to have any impact on our civil
justice system, the most likely candidate is in the area of wrongful
death. Whether the Fund will serve as a model for future mass disas-
ters or even mass torts, as well as whether it will influence tort law
generally, are the principal remaining topics to which I will now turn.
IV. LESSONS FOR MASS DISASTERS
I used to think that, after the Fund was wrapped up, cool heads
would sit down and develop a prototype for future funds, including a
set of statutory conditions that would automatically trigger their oper-
ation, based on objective factors that would justify a public expendi-
ture program like this one. It seemed so rational to do the thinking in
advance and not let the emotions of a given moment interfere with the
analysis. It was a neat, logical approach, but I have now concluded
that there is no way that a law like that will ever be enacted, or if it
were, that it would come up with the right set of answers.
I begin with the assumption that, like this Fund, future funds would
be based on the political model, which is to say, the product of a series
of compromises, based on the special circumstances of each disaster.
Congress is known for its unwillingness to face up to hard questions in
advance (sometimes with good reason), and it is almost unimaginable
that the two houses would ever be willing to devote enough attention
to a very difficult and politically charged matter, like this, to set up
another system to deal with a September 11th-type event, unless their
backs are to the wall and they have no choice.
But, even if the will was in Congress to write such a law, the choices
of what events would trigger the program are far from clear. Would
Oklahoma City come within such a law if it happened now? Or, if the
only crash that killed people not on the planes was at the Pentagon (a
military installation) would the Fund have been created, or should a
fund be created in that situation? I do not know my answers to those
questions; but even more important, I am sure there are no "right"
answers, and I am even more sure that members of Congress would
2003]
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never tackle such difficult questions unless they had to do so, espe-
cially when many members do not expect to be in office if or when
another September 11th-type disaster occurs. At the very least, Con-
gress would want to have some idea of possible solvent and liable de-
fendants, and the extent of possible losses, before establishing another
no-fault fund, even if it already had the benefit of the kind of legal
analyses presented in the articles at this symposium.
There are further reasons why enactment of a pre-disaster statute
seems unlikely and probably ill-advised. The Fund embodies a no-
fault recovery system for a variety of reasons, but in the next cases,
some of those reasons may not apply and, hence, it may make sense to
provide some fault-based determinations, either for a victim to be able
to recover, or to allow the United States to use subrogation principles
to recoup from wrongdoers some or all of the money that it pays out
to victims and their families. Furthermore, Congress's willingness to
pay the kind of damages that the Fund is paying here is by no means
certain, and will, as it did to some extent here, depend on a variety of
unknown and currently unknowable factors. Finally, as Janet Alexan-
der's article clearly demonstrates, even setting up procedures now is
impossible because the procedures must be based on the substantive
principles that they are designed to carry out, and not the other way
around.5 Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules for a fund
of this kind are not trans-substantive, but are directly tied to the na-
ture of the determinations to be made and the amounts that may be
paid out under such a scheme.
In short, however theoretically nice it would be to have an ad-
vanced plan for dealing with future disasters like September 11th,
such a law almost certainly will not, and probably should not, be
passed by Congress before another similar disaster occurs. This does
not mean that the articles and discussions at this symposium and
others that will consider the work of the Fund are irrelevant, but just
that they will have their influence when new disasters arise, and have
to be considered on the run, not as part of a process that will enable
Congress to enact a well-thought-out plan that will apply to all future
disasters "like" September 11th, whatever that may mean.
V. LESSONS FOR ORDINARY TORT LAW
The statute creating the Fund followed tort law (without saying
which state's), but rejected the general rule that collateral sources of
5. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Procedural Design and Terror Victim Compensation, 53
DEPAUL L.REV. 627 (2003).
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payments do not offset damages payable to the plaintiff.6 Instead, it
provided that all collateral sources would serve as offsets, including a
form of payment never thought to come within the collateral source
rule-life insurance. The Abraham and Logue article explains why
the general rule makes sense, why life insurance is generally not part
of the discussion of changing the general rule, and why it may none-
theless have been perfectly sensible for Congress to have provided for
collateral source offsets in this situation, principally because there is
no third party to which the government would look for subrogation. 7
They also discuss the Special Master's nuanced treatment of those
sources for which the victim has personally paid-parts of life insur-
ance and pensions, being the principal ones-despite the seemingly
broad statutory command.8 Some commentators are justifiably skep-
tical of the reasons given for rejecting the idea of bringing charity
within the collateral source offset, except for charity provided before
the Fund was created or that was given in-kind or in small amounts.
But there were reports that some families had their mortgage pay-
ments made through charity, including some very large ones, and it is
more difficult to see why (politics aside, which is probably impossible)
money given for that purpose should be excluded from the offsets re-
quired by the law. Whether one agrees with either the law or with the
way that the Special Master interpreted it, there is an abundance of
material from which a thoughtful dialog on collateral sources could
begin.
The evidence that lawmakers are carefully considering the doctrine
of collateral source offsets in light of the Fund's treatment of them is
not encouraging. This year, the House of Representatives passed
House Resolution 5 (H.R. 5), the Help Efficient Accessible, Low-cost
Timely Healthcare Act (Health Act), 9 which is a major effort by Con-
gress to limit damages of many different kinds in ordinary tort actions
based on state law.10 One part, section 6, deals with collateral sources
under the title "Additional Health Benefits," and it reverses the pre-
vailing state law rule and precludes plaintiffs from recovering anything
dubbed an "additional health benefit."'" That phrase suggests that
this provision is limited to payments for hospital and doctors bills, but
6. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act. Pub. L. No.107- 42, §§ 401-409, 115
Stat. 230, 231 (2001).
7. See Abraham & Logue, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See generally Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-Cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of
2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
10. Id. § 2(b).
11. Id. § 6.
2003]
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the text uses the phrase "collateral source benefits,"12 which seems
broader than the title, although perhaps less broad than the collateral
source offset provision governing the Fund, which specifically in-
cluded life insurance. 13 On the other hand, because this is (or would
become) federal law, as is the law governing the Fund, some would
argue that Congress meant to establish the same offsets as under the
Fund, and that would include many other sources, including life insur-
ance if there were a death claim.
To add to the confusion, H.R. 5 speaks in terms of introduction of
evidence on this topic, not of changing the law, but that may be no
more than a drafting issue because this provision allows plaintiffs to
show that they (or someone on their behalf, which might or might not
include an employer) paid for these other sources of funding, much
the way that the Special Master has done. Moreover, H.R. 5 would
also forbid all forms of subrogation, not only against the claimant, but
against any third party, a feature not found in the Fund's statute, but
which seems primarily designed to protect defendants and their liabil-
ity insurance companies and to hurt plaintiffs and their health insur-
ance carriers. 14 Moreover, section 6 applies to settlements as well as
litigated judgments, although how that is to be enforced remains
unclear. 15
One can debate the wisdom of this proposal, but it is hard to see
what lessons its sponsors gained, or even sought to gain, from the ex-
perience of the Fund. It seems much more directed at lowering recov-
eries for plaintiffs (and the lawyers who make it possible for them to
get to court) than at any rational allocation of responsibility for paying
for injuries among first- and third-party insurers and those persons
who commit tortious acts. And, for states that are considering legisla-
tive "tort reform," proponents of such change can point to the law
that created the Fund that supports their approach, even though the
circumstances are quite different. It may well be that lessons for ordi-
nary tort law will be taken from the operation of the Fund, but there is
reason to fear they will be the wrong ones, largely because the reasons
for applying certain doctrines in this situation have little, if any, bear-
ing on their applicability elsewhere-a fact that seems to have gone
unnoticed in H.R. 5, if the Fund is any part of the basis for section 6.
12. Id.
13. 28 C.F.R. § 104.47(a) (2003).
14. See generally H.R. 5.
15. Id.
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VI. TRUTH AND ACCOUNTABILITY
Several speakers and panelists have remarked on the role of litiga-
tion in determining the "truth" about what caused the events of Sep-
tember l1th and of the desire to hold "accountable" persons other
than those who planned and carried out the attacks for the loss of
three thousand lives and the other devastation. Presumably, those re-
marks are aimed at finding out what blame should be assessed against
various parts of the federal government, such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House (cur-
rent and prior), and those responsible for airline and airport security.
Those goals are admirable, but if there is one thing clear about any
litigation that may take place, it is that inquiries of that kind will never
be allowed, either because the Government will have the case dis-
missed for failure to state a legal claim against it, or because the Gov-
ernment will claim a national security privilege that would enable it to
refuse to answer pertinent questions, even if that meant that no claim-
ant could gather the evidence needed to prevail. There is a special
commission designed to answer those questions, but even it is having
problems gaining what it considers to be necessary access to records
that will enable it to carry out its mission. Answers to issues of ac-
countability may nor may not be produced, but in this situation, litiga-
tion by victims has no chance of achieving that goal.
VII. A PLEA TO THE SPECIAL MASTER
There is already a vast public record of the work of the Fund that
will be a treasure trove for scholars, but there is much that may not be
written down and will be suppressed, or both, on any number of
grounds. Apparently, despite the grid, the Special Master is asked
quite often, and agrees less often, but still in a significant number of
cases, not to follow the grid, or perhaps more precisely the recommen-
dation of Pricewaterhouse Coopers as to the application of the grid to
a particular claimant. If the public is to evaluate the program, and in
particular the use of a grid, it is essential to know when and why the
grid was not applied, whether all deviations were in the upward direc-
tion, and who benefited from the deviations (claimants represented by
counsel or those with other distinguishing, but commonly held,
features).
I leave aside the question of whether it is ever proper for the estate
of a deceased person that is receiving large amounts from the federal
government to make a personal privacy claim when the issue is the
basis for that federal payment. Assuming that such claims have some
2003]
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validity, at the very least, the files could be redacted so that a person's
general circumstances, including income and offsets, would be public,
without identifying the person, except perhaps to someone who knew
the deceased very well. Moreover, it would be a relatively easy matter
to computerize the key data in each file and to develop statistics that
are likely to interest scholars and policy makers, instead of leaving
that work to be done by hand inputs once the Fund is no longer in
business.
As part of a federal agency, the records of the Special Master are
subject to the Freedom of Information Act 16 and even more impor-
tantly, the Federal Records Act,17 which requires that records of his-
toric interest, which these surely are, be retained and made public,
subject to certain limited exceptions.18 It would not only be appropri-
ate, but highly advisable, for the Special Master to consult with the
National Archives now, so that when the time comes to close shop,
the office is ready to make its records available to the maximum possi-
ble extent. If there are lessons to be learned from the operation of
this Fund, many of them will come from the details of how it actually
worked, and for that, the records of the Special Master are the essen-
tial ingredient.
16. 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(a)(3) (2003).
17. 44 U.S.C.S. § 3101 (2003).
18. 44 U.S.C.S. 3102 (2003); 5 U.S.C.S. § 552(a)(4)(B), (a)(3)(E).
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